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PREVIEW; Pierce v. Jacobsen: Burdens on Speech Under
Montana’s Ballot Initiative Restrictions
Ben McKee*
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit will
hear oral argument in Pierce v. Jacobsen on Wednesday, February
9, 2022 at 9:00 a.m. in the Pioneer Courthouse, Portland, Oregon.
Paul A. Rossi of IMPG Advocates is expected to appear on behalf
of appellants Nathan Pierce, Montana Coalition for Rights,
Montanans for Citizen Voting, Liberty Initiative Fund, and Sherri
Ferrell. Austin Knudsen, Hannah E. Tokerud, and Patrick M. Risken
are expected to appear on behalf of appellees Christi Jacobsen, in
her official capacity as the Secretary of State for the State of
Montana, Austin Knudsen, in his official capacity as the Attorney
General of Montana, and Jeff Mangan, in his official capacity as the
Commissioner of the Montana Commission on Political Practices.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The issue in this case is whether a Montana statute requiring
that petition circulators be state residents, and prohibiting initiative
proponents from compensating petition circulators on a persignature basis, imposes a severe burden on political speech
protected by the First Amendment. If the court of appeals
determines the answer to either of these questions is yes, the court
will apply strict scrutiny—or else remand to the district court to do
so—which will likely result in one or both of the challenged
provisions being struck down.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.

Constitutional Initiatives in Montana

The Montana Constitution provides that Montana citizens
may amend the Constitution by initiative.1 Petitions that include the
full text of the proposed amendment must be signed by at least 10%
of Montana voters, including at least 10% of voters in each of twofifths of the state’s legislative districts.2 The initiative’s proponents
must then file the petitions with the Secretary of State; if the
Secretary determines that the petitions have been signed by the
required number of voters, the proposed amendment will be

*

J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of
Montana, Class of 2023.
1
MONT. CONST. art. XIV, § 9(1).
2
Id.
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published twice each month for the two months leading up to the
next state-wide election.3
At that election, the proposed amendment will be submitted
to the voters, and if a majority of the voters approve the initiative,
the amendment becomes a part of the Constitution.4
B.

2006 Fraud and Legislative Response

Understanding the context of the instant case requires
looking at the events of the 2006 elections in Montana. That year,
proponents of three initiatives submitted their signed petitions with
the requisite signatures to election officials.5 Parties opposing the
initiatives subsequently filed a complaint alleging that the
proponents’ signature gatherers had obtained signatures in a
deceptive manner and had perjured themselves in swearing to the
contents on the form affidavits.6 Following a bench trial in Montana
district court, the court found that the proponents had engaged in
fraud and procedural non-compliance in the gathering of
signatures.7 The proponents had relied primarily on paid out-of-state
petition circulators to obtain the vast majority of signatures, and had
paid the circulators based on the number of signatures they
obtained.8 The district court determined that the signature gatherers
(1) falsely attested that they personally gathered the signatures when
they were actually gathered by other persons, (2) used false
addresses on their certification affidavits, and (3) employed
deceitful “bait and switch” tactics when interacting with voters.9 The
Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s findings and
its order invalidating the Secretary of State’s certification of the
initiatives.10
In 2007, the Montana Legislature responded to the prior
year’s instances of fraud by passing Senate Bill 96, requiring
persons circulating an initiative petition to be Montana residents,
and prohibiting their compensation based on the number of

3

Id. art. XIV, § 9(2).
Id. art. XIV, § 9(3).
5
Montanans for Just. v. State, 146 P.3d 759, 764 (Mont. 2006).
6
Id. at 764–65.
7
Id. at 763.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 770.
10
Id. at 778.
4
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signatures gathered.11 The relevant provisions were codified at
Montana Code Annotated § 13-27-102(2).12
C.

Current Litigation and Procedural Posture

In March 2018, Paul Jacob came to Montana to form a
committee to secure ballot access for an initiative that would amend
the Montana Constitution to limit voting in state elections to United
States citizens.13 In April 2018, Montanans for Citizen Voting was
incorporated for this purpose.14 Jacob solicited bids for the petition
drive from two firms: Advanced Micro Targeting (“AMT”), based
in Texas, and Silver Bullet, based in Wyoming.15 AMT bid
$500,000 for the petition drive, and although AMT expressly stated
it would not pay signature gatherers based on the number of
signatures obtained—because AMT believed such a compensation
system encouraged fraud—Jacob was concerned about the effect
Montana’s per-signature compensation ban would have on the
petition drive, as well as the residency requirement.16 Silver Bullet
bid $469,000 to obtain 80,000 signatures, and additionally agreed
that if Montana officials were enjoined from enforcing the residency
requirement and pay-per-signature ban, Silver Bullet would charge
one dollar less per signature.17
On May 9, 2018, Montanans for Citizen Voting, alongside
Jacob’s Liberty Initiative Fund; Montana Coalition for Rights—a
lobbying group involved in advancing previous ballot initiatives in
Montana18—and its founder Nathan Pierce; and Sherri Ferrell, a
professional signature gatherer who performed initiative petitioning
services across the country19 (collectively “MCV”) filed suit in
United States District Court for the District of Montana.20 Naming
then-Secretary of State Corey Stapleton and Attorney General Tim
Fox (collectively “the State”) as defendants in their official
capacities,21 MCV asserted that the pay-per-signature ban and

11

Pierce v. Stapleton, 505 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1064 (D. Mont. 2020); see MONT.
CODE ANN. § 13-27-102(2) (2007) (“A person gathering signatures for the
initiative, the referendum, or to call a constitutional convention: (a) must be a
resident . . . of the state of Montana; and (b) may not be paid anything of value
based upon the number of signatures gathered.”).
12
See § 13-27-102(2).
13
Pierce, 505 F. Supp. at 1064–65.
14
Id. at 1064.
15
Id. at 1065.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 1064.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 1065.
21
Id. at 1059.
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residency requirement in § 13-27-102(2) violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.22
The July 22, 2018 deadline for submitting signatures for the
2018 election passed without MCV attempting to qualify its citizenvoting initiative for the ballot.23 MCV and the State filed crossmotions for summary judgment,24 and on December 4, 2020, the
district court granted the State’s motion,25 finding that MCV failed
to show that either of the challenged restrictions on signature
gathering violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.26
D.

District Court’s Reasoning

In granting summary judgment for the State, the district
court agreed with MCV that speech associated with petition
circulation involves “interactive communication concerning
political change” and is therefore political speech protected by the
First Amendment.27 However, the court also noted that the power to
propose ballot initiatives is a state-created right, not one protected
by the federal constitution,28 and cited Ninth Circuit precedent in
Prete v. Bradbury29 establishing that “[s]tates allowing ballot
initiatives have considerable leeway to protect the integrity and
reliability of the initiative process, as they have with respect to the
election processes generally.”30
The district court cited the United States Supreme Court’s
Anderson-Burdick framework for evaluating the constitutionality of
a ballot access measure that is challenged on First Amendment
grounds, in which “the character and magnitude of the asserted
injury” to the plaintiffs’ rights are weighed against “the precise
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden
imposed by its rule,” considering “the extent to which those interests

22

Id. at 1062; see U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No
state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .”).
23
Pierce, 505 F. Supp. at 1065–66.
24
Id. at 1062.
25
Appellants’ Opening Brief at 11, Pierce v. Jacobsen, No. 21-35173 (9th Cir.
July 2, 2021), https://perma.cc/C6G2-ML5H.
26
Pierce, 505 F. Supp. at 1075–76.
27
Id. at 1066 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422 (1988)).
28
Id. at 1067 (citing Meyer, 486 U.S. at 424).
29
438 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2006).
30
Pierce, 505 F. Supp. at 1066–67 (quoting Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949,
961 (9th Cir. 2006)).
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make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”31 Applying this
framework to Montana’s residency requirements for signature
gatherers, the district court found that MCV failed to demonstrate
“that there are not enough Montana residents to serve as circulators
or that Montana residents are inferior communicators” and offered
“little to no actual evidence that the residency requirement put a
limitation on the voices or the audience they were able to reach.”32
In addition to citing the United States Supreme Court in
Meyer v. Grant,33 regarding burdens on political speech arising from
state regulation of petition circulation—including regulations that
make it less likely that proponents will obtain the requisite number
of signatures34—the district court also cited the Ninth Circuit in
Angle v. Miller,35 where the court of appeals held that strict scrutiny
only applied when a reasonably diligent campaign could not
normally secure its initiative on the ballot, as a result of such
regulations creating a severe burden on the proponents’ speech.36
Applying this Angle test, the district court determined that MCV did
not act with reasonable diligence, as the proponents of the citizenvoting initiative waited until April 2018 to incorporate, and in May
2018, instead of gathering signatures, MCV filed a lawsuit and took
no further steps to qualify the initiative for either the 2018 or 2020
ballots.37 The district court therefore could not conclude that the
residency requirement created a severe burden on MCV’s rights, and
thus held that there was no basis to apply strict scrutiny.38 The court
determined that the State’s regulatory interests were sufficient to
uphold the residency requirement in § 13-27-102(2), and granted
summary judgment to the State on that claim.39
Regarding MCV’s First Amendment challenge to the
prohibition on per-signature compensation, the district court again
cited Prete, where the court of appeals upheld Oregon’s ban on
paying signature gatherers on a per-signature basis,40 in part because
the challengers’ assertions—regarding the difficulty of signature
gathering under state election law— were based on “unsupported
31

Id. at 1067 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789
(1983).
32
Id. at 1070.
33
486 U.S. 414 (1988).
34
Pierce, 505 F. Supp. at 1067 (citing Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422–23
(1988)).
35
673 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2012).
36
Pierce, 505 F. Supp. at 1067 (citing Angle v. Miller, 673 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th
Cir. 2012)).
37
Id. at 1071.
38
Id. at 1072.
39
Id. at 1072–73.
40
Id. at 1073 (citing Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 2006)).
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speculation,” and the Oregon law thus constituted a lesser burden
under the Anderson-Burdick framework which was not subject to
strict scrutiny.41 In applying Prete to MCV’s claims, the district
court found that the MCV’s assertion that the pay-per-signature ban
constituted a severe burden was similarly speculative and
unsupported by the record.42 In applying “a relaxed level of
scrutiny,” the court determined that the State’s interests were
sufficient to uphold the pay-per-signature prohibition in § 13-27102(2),43 and granted summary judgment to the State on that claim
as well.44
III.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
A.

Appellants’ Arguments

On appeal, MCV offers two arguments: (1) The district court
should have applied a strict scrutiny analysis to MCV’s challenge to
Montana’s residency requirement; and (2) the district court should
have applied strict scrutiny to MCV’s challenge to Montana’s ban
on compensating professional petition circulators based on the
number of valid signatures collected.
First, MCV asserts that strict scrutiny is the correct standard
of review for the residency requirement because those restrictions
impose a severe burden on First Amendment speech.45 MCV
concedes that lesser burdens require a less exacting level of
scrutiny,46 but cites the Ninth Circuit case Nader v. Brewer,47
asserting that the severity of the burden is assessed based on the
number of people the residency requirement excludes from
gathering signatures.48 MCV discusses how, in Nader, the court
applied strict scrutiny to Arizona’s residency requirement for
candidate ballot access petitions because the law reduced the pool
of available signature gatherers.49 MCV argues that by excluding all
individuals outside Montana, § 13-27-102(2) constitutes a severe
burden,50 and like the Arizona law in Nader, § 13-27-102(2) is not
narrowly tailored, because the state could instead require that non-

41

Id. (citing Prete, 438 F.3d at 964–65).
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 1075.
45
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 25, at 23.
46
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 25, at 18 (citing Timmons v. Twin
Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358–59 (1997)).
47
531 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2008).
48
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 25, at 28 (citing Nader v. Brewer, 531
F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2008)).
49
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 25, at 20.
50
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 25, at 33
42
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resident signature gatherers submit to Montana’s jurisdiction, rather
than impose a blanket ban.51
Second, MCV argues that the district court should have also
applied strict scrutiny to the ban on compensating signature
gatherers based on the number of valid signatures collected.52 MCV
asserts strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review because
the compensation ban imposes a severe burden on political speech
by (1) making it less likely that the initiative proponents will gather
the requisite number of signatures, (2) reducing the pool of available
signature gatherers, (3) eliminating the professionals who are best
able to convey the initiative’s message, (4) reducing the size of the
audience the proponents can reach, and (5) increasing the overall
cost of signature gathering.53 In arguing that § 13-27-102(2) is not
narrowly tailored, MCV asserts that Montana could discourage
fraud by allowing compensation based on valid signatures gathered,
as opposed to compensation based on all signatures regardless of
validity.54 MCV argues that Montana could additionally protect
against fraud by implementing a registration system, whereby
signature gatherers would be required to register with the Secretary
of State and provide proof of their identity and current legal address
before starting work circulating any petitions.55 MCV also argues
that the State’s restrictions are underinclusive because they do not
apply to signature campaigns that seek to qualify political
candidates for the ballot.56
B.

Appellees’ Arguments

In response, the State—with current Secretary of State
Christi Jacobsen and Attorney General Austin Knudsen
automatically substituted for Corey Stapleton and Tim Fox57—
argues that (1) the district court was correct in determining that the
provisions of § 13-27-102(2) do not impose a severe burden on
MCV, and (2) even if strict scrutiny does apply, the statute survives.
First, the State argues that neither the residency requirement
nor the pay-per-signature ban constitutes a severe burden on MCV’s
political speech.58 The State cites Ninth Circuit precedent that the
severity of the burden imposed by an election law is a question of
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 25, at 41–42.
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 25, at 44.
53
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 25, at 17–18.
54
Appellants’ Reply Brief at 19, Pierce v. Jacobsen, No. 21-35173 (9th Cir. Oct.
22, 2021), https://perma.cc/RH2W-2URK.
55
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 25, at 54.
56
Appellants’ Reply Brief, supra note 54, at 21.
57
Brief of Appellees at 1 n.1, Pierce v. Jacobsen, No. 21-35173 (9th Cir. Sep. 1,
2021), https://perma.cc/AGZ2-C739.
58
Brief of Appellees, supra note 57, at 16.
51
52
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fact, not a question of law.59 The State then notes the district court’s
finding that MCV failed to show actual evidence—such as data,
expert opinion, or comparison information—of the burden caused
by the residency requirement, and contends that MCV’s brief
continues to provide only conclusory and speculative claims.60 The
State also notes that much of the authority MCV cites regarding
challenges to residency requirements in other states—including the
Ninth Circuit decision in Nader—were cases dealing with candidate
petitions, not ballot initiatives, and are therefore irrelevant.61 Of
MCV’s cases that the State acknowledges are relevant, the State
distinguishes the facts in those cases from the facts here, as the
challengers to the residency requirements cited by MCV had
actually launched initiative drives, and had either failed to obtain the
requisite number of signatures or had been inhibited in recruiting
quality signature gatherers as a result of the restrictions.62 In
addition, the states in those cases had not shown any history of fraud
committed by non-resident signature gatherers, in contrast to
Montana’s experience.63
Regarding the ban on per-signature compensation, the State
asserts that Prete controls, and in that case, the Ninth Circuit rejected
similar arguments that a pay-per-signature ban severe burdened the
plaintiffs, e.g., by allegedly reducing the pool of signature gatherers,
creating higher costs, and making it more difficult to obtain valid
signatures.64 The State asserts that MCV’s relies on irrelevant
authority to evade the clear applicability of Prete.65
Finally, the State argues that even if the court were to apply
strict scrutiny, the provisions of § 13-27-102(2) should be upheld
because, in addition to Montana’s compelling interest in election
integrity, the statute is narrowly tailored to target the specific abuses
that Montana has actually experienced66—fraud committed by nonresident circulators, who were compensated on a per-signature
basis.67

59

Brief of Appellees, supra note 57, at 16 (citing Democratic Party of Hawaii v.
Nago, 833 F.3d 1119, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 2016)).
60
Brief of Appellees, supra note 57, at 17–18.
61
Brief of Appellees, supra note 57, at 22.
62
Brief of Appellees, supra note 57, at 23–24.
63
Brief of Appellees, supra note 57, at 25.
64
Brief of Appellees, supra note 57, at 28 (citing Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d
949, 963–66 (9th Cir. 2006)).
65
Brief of Appellees, supra note 57, at 31.
66
Brief of Appellees, supra note 57, at 35–36.
67
Brief of Appellees, supra note 57, at 44.
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ANALYSIS

As both sides note in their briefs, the crux of these issues
comes down to whether § 13-27-102(2) places such a burden on
protected political speech that strict scrutiny applies, and thus the
district court erred in applying only a “less exacting scrutiny.”68
As the United States Supreme Court has held, “[r]egulations
imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs’ rights must be narrowly
tailored and advance a compelling state interest,” while lesser
burdens “trigger less exacting review, and a State’s important
regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions.”69 However, “[n]o bright line
separates
permissible
election-related
regulation
from
unconstitutional infringements on First Amendment freedoms.”70
By arguing that the residency requirement’s effect of
reducing the pool of available signature gatherers warrants strict
scrutiny, MCV arguably suggests a bright-line test. However,
MCV’s strongest argument comes in its citations to Nader, where
the Ninth Circuit held—relying on the United States Supreme
Court’s opinion in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law
Foundation, Inc.71—that “significantly reducing the number of
potential circulators impose[s] a severe burden on rights of political
expression.”72 The State responds by attempting to distinguish
Nader as applying only to candidate petitions, but fails to say more
as to why the same rule would not apply to initiative petitions,
especially in considering that the latter had been the subject of the
Court’s opinion in Buckley.73
However, as the State argues more effectively, the court will
look to the facts of the case, and as the district court noted in its
summary judgment order, the Ninth Circuit provided in Angle—four
years after Nader—the test for determining what facts create a
severe burden on initiative proponents:
[A]s applied to the initiative process, we assume that
ballot access restrictions place a severe burden on
core political speech, and trigger strict scrutiny,
when they significantly inhibit the ability of initiative
proponents to place initiatives on the ballot.
This is similar to the standard we apply to ballot
access restrictions regulating candidates. In that
68

See Pierce v. Stapleton, 505 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1068 (D. Mont. 2020).
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997).
70
Id. at 359.
71
525 U.S. 182 (1999).
72
Nader v. Brewer, 531 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Buckley v. Am.
Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 194–95 (1999)).
73
See Buckley, 525 U.S. at 205.
69
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setting, we have held that ‘the burden on plaintiffs’
rights should be measured by whether, in light of the
entire statutory scheme regulating ballot access,
reasonably diligent candidates can normally gain a
place on the ballot, or whether they will rarely
succeed in doing so.’74
In determining the appropriate level of scrutiny, the court in
Angle went on to say:
[The plaintiffs] have not presented any evidence that,
despite reasonably diligent efforts, they and other
initiative proponents have been unable to qualify
initiatives for the ballot as a result of the geographic
distribution requirement imposed by the [challenged
law]. On this record, no severe burden has been
shown. Strict scrutiny therefore does not apply.75
Between the enactment of § 13-27-102(2) in 2007 and the
district court’s summary judgment order in December 2020, 14
initiative petitions qualified for the ballot in Montana.76 This
average of two initiatives on the ballot for each biennial state-wide
election would indicate that initiative proponents in Montana can, in
fact, normally gain a place on the ballot when exercising reasonable
diligence.
In addition, although MCV cites Nader extensively
throughout its brief, nowhere does MCV acknowledge Angle or this
reasonable diligence test—which the court borrowed from its prior
opinion in Nader.
Because MCV did not exercise any reasonably diligent
efforts, having never actually started the initiative campaign, and
instead brought this litigation in hopes of receiving injunctive relief
from § 13-27-102(2) before commencing the signature drive, MCV
cannot demonstrate a severe burden on its First Amendment rights
under Angle’s test.
Further, the court of appeals stated in Angle—citing Prete—
that because the plaintiffs’ failed to show the challenged law
imposed severe burdens, the state needed only to show that the law
furthered “an important regulatory interest.”77 Because MCV does
not contest in its briefs that the State has such important interests,
and because the State asserts in its brief that this interest is one the

74

Angle v. Miller, 673 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Nader, 531
F.3d at 1035) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
75
Id. at 1134 (emphasis added).
76
Pierce v. Stapleton, 505 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1071 (D. Mont. 2020).
77
Angle, 673 F.3d at 1134–35 (citing Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 969 (9th
Cir. 2006)).
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court should find compelling,78 the State has likely satisfied its
burden in justifying the provisions of § 13-27-102(2).
Angle’s broad language would apparently help to answer the
question of burdens for both the residency requirement and the payper-signature ban. However, the district court cited Angle only in its
discussion of the former, and the State does not rely on Angle in its
brief except for one citation in the introduction of its argument.79
Turning to Montana’s ban on per-signature compensation,
the district court relied primarily on the court of appeals in Prete,
holding that unsupported speculation regarding the difficulty of
signature gathering is not adequate to show a severe burden. MCV
attempts to distinguish the Prete plaintiffs’ “incomplete factual
record” from its own “undisputed and unequivocal record,” but in
expanding on this record, MCV proceeds to state only a series of
conclusory statements based on deposition testimony, an anecdote
about “a lady, being paid $15.00 per hour in her home, doing
nothing,” an excerpt from a 2011 veto message by then-California
governor Jerry Brown, and testimony from a witness who “does not
disagree” with the sentiments in Governor Brown’s 2011 message.80
Therefore, even without Angle, Ninth Circuit precedent under Prete
would lead to the conclusion that MCV’s arguments, lacking
evidence and based on speculation, fail to show that the pay-persignature ban in § 13-27-102(2) severely burdens its rights.
Thus, the court of appeals will likely side with the appellees
and affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the
State regarding the per-signature compensation ban. The court of
appeals will likely also affirm regarding the residency requirement,
but given Nader, this is a closer call.
V.

CONCLUSION

In considering, first, the sum of applicable Ninth Circuit
precedent on election restrictions and their burden on First
Amendment speech; next, the history of specific abuses that
prompted the Montana Legislature to enact the residency
requirement and ban on per-signature compensation for circulators
of initiative petitions; and finally, the facts of this litigation—in
particular, that MCV never actually attempted to gather signatures
to qualify its initiative for the ballot—the court of appeals will likely
affirm the district court’s determination that strict scrutiny does not
apply to either provision in § 13-27-102(2) and affirm the grant of
summary judgment for the State in MCV’s claims against it.
However, given that the question of scrutiny for the residency
78

Brief of Appellees, supra note 57, at 35–36.
See Brief of Appellees, supra note 57, at 14.
80
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 25, at 47–49.
79
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requirement is a closer call, the court’s decision may depend on
whether the State, at oral argument, can more adequately distinguish
the challenged law in Nader from this statute and the precedents that
apply.

